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UNJUST INTENT AND IMPACT
Martha T. McCluskey*
The recent economic crisis has breathed new life into policies of upward
redistribution, even as it uncovered the disastrous results of a financial market bubble
inflated by siphoning assets from the bottom, to the top. The Tea Party and the
Occupy Wall Street movements both reflect widespread perceptions that justice has
been bitterly upended in a system where the fallout from the crisis devastates many
who are most vulnerable, while bailouts protect some of the richest and most
culpable. As prospects for major reform dim, the now-familiar concept of
"unintended consequences" has repeatedly surfaced to help explain and excuse the
legal framework that supports this perverse economic reordering. How can we
challenge the ideological story this phrase conveys, in order to open the door to
alternative economic policies?
The prevailing tendency to analyze inequality and austerity as a problem of
"unintended consequences" deflects scrutiny of injustice. By professing attention to
the results of a background politics of presumed benevolence, this phrase mystifies
and excuses the structures designed to produce unequal harm. The recent financial
crisis is an example of how explaining devastating harm as "unintended
consequences" helps quiet the moral and political outrage that such harm might
otherwise inspire.
Part I describes the 2008 financial market meltdown as an acute instance of
a familiar historic pattern of schemes designed to extract wealth from the middle and
bottom socioeconomic groups to deliver unstable gains concentrated at the top. Part
II will trace the development of the term, showing how its challenge to social change
gives a legal, realist twist to the Lochner era message of naturalized inequality. Part
III will explore how the concept has muddied debate about the financial crisis and
suggests steps for cutting through this obfuscation with a sharper analysis of who
should be held responsible for social and economic harms, including possibilities for
positive change. Part IV will connect the "unintended consequences" message,
which emphasizes the harmful results of law reform, to the coinciding trend in law
and politics that insists on analyzing inequality by focusing primarily on good intent,
instead of harmful results. These seemingly conflicting messages work together to
make structures and institutions designed for racial and economic hierarchy appear
natural and necessary, beyond the reach of law.
* Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Fellow, State University of New York at Buffalo,
mcclusk@buffalo.edu. Thanks to Anthony Farley for organizing and inspiring the panel Post-Marxism,
Post-Realism & Other Fables of Dispossession at the 2010 Third National People of Color Legal
Scholarship Conference, where I presented a version of these ideas. Thanks also to the organizers, co-
panelists and participants in the LatCrit XV plenary session, The Color of The Economic Crises:
Exploring the Downturn from the Bottom Up, for helping to further develop this paper.
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I. UNJUST IMPACT
When the harm of this crisis is described as "unintended consequences," it
appears to be a surprise, or an anomaly. Yet this strategy of upward redistribution is
part of a pattern familiar to those who have paid attention to the purposes and results
of the global neoliberal policies in developing countries. As former "economic hit
man" John Perkins describes, as an agent of U.S. and multinational corporations in
economically struggling nations of Latin America and Southeast Asia, his job was to
"identify countries with resources our corporations covet."' This work required him
to concoct elaborate, misleading economic reports as part of a government-backed
corporate strategy executed by deceit, bribery, extortion, and violence to pressure the
leaders of target countries to agree to exploitative "development" loans. These
unaffordable loans would then effectively induce third-world countries to transfer
their natural resources to outside corporations at bargain prices, but with high
environmental and cultural costs that were supported by austerity measures designed
to divert government spending from economic security of the poor and middle
classes to further secure corporate investor gains.3 Perkins argues that the recent
crisis reveals how this well-honed scheme now has turned toward the people of
developed nations.4
The homes of struggling Americans were the coveted resource tapped for
dispossession and upward transfer in the recent crisis. The largest Wall Street
financial firms joined with numerous ground-level lenders to mine the home equity
of the large numbers of Americans who were squeezed by modest incomes, meager
government services, and rising debt. Capitalizing on this desperate need for credit,
subprime mortgages siphoned struggling Americans' home equity into investment
instruments that produced temporarily high returns for some investors and financial
industry executives. Global financial firms poured money into the subprime
mortgage industry, supporting its plan to aggressively sell loans with exorbitant fees
to borrowers unable to afford the mortgage payments without depending on
continuously rising home values or by taking on further debt. The financial firms
then earned high fees for packaging these largely unaffordable mortgages into
complex interdependent risk-spreading and risk-hedging arrangements marketed to
investors as innovative, low-risk, high-return deals. At every financing level, the
risks of these deals were covered by various forms of smoke and mirrors, including
rampant fraud. In 2005, for example, this system pumped out $665 billion in
1. JOHN PERKINS, HOODWINKED: AN ECONOMIC HITMAN REVEALS WHY THE WORLD
FINANCIAL MARKETS IMPLODED-AND WHAT WE NEED TO Do To REMAKE THEM I (2009).
2. See generally JOHN PERKINS, CONFESSIONS OF AN ECONOMIC HIT MAN (2004).
3. See PERKINS, supra note 1, at 1. For a further discussion of how finance capital has
repeatedly used debt crises to promote neoliberal policies designed to transfer wealth from the poor to the
rich, and comparing the recent financial crisis to the policies leading to the 1970s Latin American debt
crises, see Tayyab Mahmud, Is it Greek or Deja Vu All Over Again?: Neoliberalism, and Winners and
Losers ofInternational Debt Crises 50 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
4. PERKINS, supra note 1, at 1.
5. See Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner Before
the Committee on Financial Services, Illth Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of William K. Black,, Associate
Professor of Economics and Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City). [Hereinafter Black, Statement on
Lehman Bankruptcy].
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subprime loans, representing a 25% growth over the previous year. By 2007, the
bubble was quickly collapsing from defaulting loans and falling housing values, and
lenders turned to foreclosure, with large financial firms and their agents
appropriating (and skimming further high fees from) now-deflated home equity, in
the process destroying a resource that typically comprised the borrowers' primary
life savings, as well as a mainstay of less tangible social capital.
Because the risks of the bubble had spread so widely within the financial
industry, through interdependent and highly-leveraged deals, the collapse brought
losses that threatened to bankrupt most of the large financial firms on which the elite
global economy depends. Fearing that these firms were "too big to fail," Congress
spent $700 billion to buy the "toxic" deals under the hastily crafted Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP), which was followed by over three trillion dollars of nearly
free credit for banks from the Federal Reserve, thanks in part to a 1991 reform law
(suggested by Goldman Sachs) that eased requirements that such credit be supported
by meaningful collateral. In contrast, the government did not give discounted credit
to keep afloat homeowners faced with collapsing home values and unaffordable
mortgage payments. 9 Reinforcing this unequal rescue policy, major banks defeated
federal legislation that would have given judges discretion to modify mortgage
10
terms.
Legal scholars, as well as political and business leaders, have justified or
even celebrated the growth of the unsound subprime mortgage system with the
seemingly egalitarian argument that its expansive credit increased access to home
ownership, especially among high-risk groups." But to the contrary, because the
explosive subprime market primarily focused on tapping existing equity, even before
the crisis and collapse in home values, the logical result of subprime lending growth
was a net loss of home ownership.12 Most subprime loans made during the 2004 to
2008 boom were not for new home purchases, but instead went to refinance existing
mortgages to provide cash for home improvements, credit card debt, and the basic
costs of living or running of small businesses.' 3 Further, a substantial portion of
6. MICHAEL W. HUDSON, THE MONSTER: HOW A GANG OF PREDATORY LENDERS AND WALL
STREET BANKERS FLEECED AMERICA-AND SPAWNED A GLOBAL CRISIS 261 (2010).
7. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWIAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 164 (2010); Gretchen Morgenson, So That's
Where the Money Went, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010 at BUI (reporting that the federal government
subsidized several leading firms by about $250 million during just two weeks during the fall of 2008).
8. JOHNSON AND KWiAK, supra note 7, at 152 (citing Pub. L. 102-242 Title IV § 473 (1991),
which amended 12 U.S.C. § 343).
9. David Streitfeld, Panel is Critical of Obama Mortgage Modification Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2010 at B2 (reporting the Treasury Department's mortgage modification plan for homeowners,
which subsidized banks to encourage them to modify mortgages, helped less than one million
homeowners).
10. JOHNSON AND Kw1AK, supra note 7, at 179.
11. HUDSON, supra note 6, at 222 (discussing Ameriquest's public relations theme); see, e.g.,
Todd J. Zywicki, The Law and Economics ofSubprime Lending, 80 U. Co. L. REv. 1, 86 (2009).
12. CTR. OF RESPONSIBLE LEARNING, SUBPRIME LOANS: A NET DRAIN IN HOME OWNERSHIP
(2007) (finding that from 1998-2006, subprime loans resulted in a net loss of homeownership for one
million families) [hereinafter CRL], available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-
lending/research-analysis/Net-Drain-in-Home-Ownership.pdf.
13. CRL at 17. HUDSON, supra note 6, at 222 (reporting that at the peak of its business in
2004, leading subprime lender Ameriquest provided just 1% of its mortgages for home purchases, with the
rest going to refinancing and home improvement).
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subprime loans were made to homeowners who qualified for more affordable
conventional loans.14
As the boom turned to bust, losses suffered by those near the bottom
escalated. In a 2010 report, the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) estimated that
2.5 million foreclosures took place from 2007 through 2009, with more than double
that number facing imminent risk of foreclosure, and with independent experts
estimating ten to thirteen million foreclosures likely before the end of the crisis. 15
Nearly one-quarter of American borrowers are "underwater," owing more on their
home mortgages than their homes are worth. The vast majority of the properties
foreclosed from 2007 to 2009 resulted from loans initiated between 2005 and 2008
on owner-occupied homes.
The impact of these foreclosures is skewed by race as well as by income,
even though the majority of borrowers facing foreclosure are white homeowners.
The CRL report estimated that seventeen percent of all Latino homeowners and
eleven percent of African-American homeowners have already lost or are at
imminent risk of losing their home,1 7 compared to seven percent of non-Hispanic
white homeowners. American-Indians, Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders,
18
including Asian-Americans also experienced higher foreclosure rates.
The racially-skewed impact of the crisis goes well beyond those who face
the loss of their home. Waves of foreclosures cause major, long-term harm to the
communities in which they are concentrated. With housing highly segregated by race
and class in the United States, communities of color are at risk of particularly
devastating indirect losses from the effects of foreclosures on neighboring properties
and on neighborhood socioeconomic conditions. The CRL report estimated that
foreclosures will cause property values to drop by $194 billion in African-American
communities, and $177 billion in Latino communities between 2009 and 2012. These
collapsed home values can raise the costs of moving to escape devastated
communities and to take new jobs, especially if homeowners have to pay off
underwater mortgages. Further, as homeowners default on unaffordable mortgages or
go into bankruptcy, many will be locked out of future economic opportunities
because of the use of credit ratings as a proxy for merit by employers and others.' 9
Of course, the collapse of the mortgage boom also has had major indirect
effects on the economy beyond housing. Wall Street's highly-leveraged and
interdependent bets on that boom spread costs throughout the global financial
industry, widely destroying jobs, investments, and tax revenue. In 2010,
unemployment remained high, many Americans had lost substantial retirement
savings beyond their homes, and the recession (along with declining property values)
14. JOHNSON & KwiAK, supra note 7, at 195-96 (citing findings of Housing and Urban
Development Secretary that 33% of subprime loans in New York City were to borrowers qualifying for
conventional loans); HUDSON, supra note 6, at 243-44.
15. DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., FORECLOSURES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY: THE
DEMOGRAPHICS OF A CRISIS 2-3 (2010), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-
lending/research-analysis/foreclosures-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf.
16. Id. at 2, 20 n. I (attributing 83% of foreclosures in 2007-09 to loans originated between
2005 and 2008).
17. Id. at 3.
I8. Id. at 2.
19. Katie Leslie and Marcus K. Garner, Bad Credit Blamed for Some Not Scoring a Job,
CHITRIBUNE, Nov. 14, 2010, at C10.
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had left state and local governments with budget deficits and cuts in government
20
spending. Unemployment and reduced government services are likely to have
particularly harsh effects on racial minorities and on modest and low-income
households and communities. A U.S. financial market meltdown is likely to increase
global inequality and poverty, as people of color in developing nations
disproportionately bear the costs of a crisis orchestrated by Wall Street elites.21
One of the many individual homeowners whose equity was tapped for this
global harm was Elizabeth Redrick, a seventy-seven year old African-American
widow and retired hospital housekeeper in Cleveland, who refinanced her mortgage
to pay off a $3,600 personal loan. A broker assured her the refinancing with a
major subprime lender would not only provide the cash to cover that debt, but also
would lower her mortgage payments on the home she had lived in for thirty-seven
years.2 3 The actual loan produced only $651 in cash, after subtracting $5,400 in up-
front fees (most of which went directly to the broker), without lowering her monthly
payments, so that she too was soon faced with foreclosure.24 Both the subprime
lender that sold the loan and Wells Fargo Bank, which quickly purchased it, failed to
question the broker's loan documents containing contradictory statements about her
25
income and personal details. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission found the
subprime lender had intentionally used race discrimination to sell this predatory
loan.26
The picture of the crisis looks different at the upper end, with Wall Street
earnings at record highs in 200927 and soaring even higher in 2010.28 The major
banks whose high-risk, profit-making strategies were a vital cause of the crisis were
29
its big winners. For example, Goldman Sachs, a major beneficiary of federal
bailouts, gave its employees an average compensation of over half a million dollars
to reflect its record profits in 2009.30
Especially staggering gains have been enjoyed by executives of the failed
subprime institutions that sold the mortgages behind the foreclosure crisis. While
Ameriquest (the largest subprime lender) collapsed, its owner Roland Arnall walked
20. JACoB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: How WASHINGTON
MADE THE RICH RICHER-AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 2 (2010).
21. Steve Schifferes, Crisis "to Trap 53m in Poverty," BBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7886334.stm (reporting estimates by the World Bank of the effect on
developing nations). See also Mahmud, supra note 3, at 4 (giving evidence of increased global
unemployment and poverty due to the crisis).
22. HUDSON, supra note 6, at 214.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also Mark Gillispie, Ohio Civil Rights Commission Finds Bias in Argent Mortgage
Lending, Cleveland.com (Mar. 19, 2008),
http://blog.cleveland.com/business/2008/03/ohio civil rights commission f.html.
25. HUDSON, supra note 6, at 214.
26. Gillispie, supra note 24.
27. HACKER AND PIERSON, supra note 20, at I (reporting that in 2009 the thirty eight biggest
companies on Wall Street earned $140 billion, the most ever recorded).
28. Liz Rappaport et al., Wall Street Pay: A Record $144 Billion, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 12, 2010,
at Cl.
29. JOHNSON & KwIAK, supra note 7, at 12.
30. Id. (citing Goldman Sachs's Oct. 15, 2009 Press Release reporting Third Quarter Earnings
per Common Share of $5.25).
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away a billionaire.3 1 Arnall (who also held a network of related subprime companies,
including one that sold the loan behind Elizabeth Redrick's foreclosure) had
carefully structured his business empire to siphon off much of its profits into his
personal accounts where they were protected from extensive public and private
32
litigation. The CEO of Countrywide, another of the largest subprime lenders, was
paid $520 million from 2000 to 2008, and made large stock gains in the year before
the company imploded.33 Higher up the chain, the top five executives at Bear Steams
and Lehman Brothers cashed out a total of about $2.4 billion in bonuses and equity
sales (above their regular salaries) from each firm before their companies collapsed
in 2008, giving them net 'performance-based" gains totaling around a billion dollars
for the period 2000-2008. From 2000 until 2007, Lehman chief executive Richard
35S. Fuld received nearly a half a billion dollars in compensation -allowing him to
walk away a rich man after bankruptin 6his company from its strategy of financing
fraudulent and unsound subprime loans.
These results seem to reveal a picture of injustice that could hardly provide
a clearer impetus for dramatic reform. Yet the theme of "unintended consequences"
has emerged (along with a number of others) to muddy the view of the problems and
solutions to the financial crisis so that inaction and acceptance seems reasonable and
even wise.
II. GOOD IDEALS, BAD RESULTS
The phrase "unintended consequences" points to the difficulty of using law
as a tool for beneficial social change. The term became a common adage in the
twentieth century, promoted in part by sociologist Robert Merton's 1936 essay, The
Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, which explained how
systematic problems in human decision making confound our attempts to achieve
38
desired outcomes. The New Deal raised expectations that a national regulatory state
could use law to control or prevent economic disaster and to increase economic
security for the masses. Addressing both the law's transformative potential and its
limits, many Twentieth Century advocates of legal realism turned to social science-
31. HUDSON, supra note 6, at 203, 252, 257.
32. Id. at 252.
33. John Gittelsohn, Payback Time for Execs, ORANGE CNTY REGISTER, Jan. 30, 2009, at §
Bus. & Fin. News; Gretchen Morgenson, Angelo Mozilo of Countrywide Settles Fraud Case for $67.5
Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, at Al (reporting that the S.E.C. found that Countrywide's CEO gained
$140 million in stock sales from 2006 to 2007).
34. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear
Stearns and Lehman, 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 270-71 (2010) (estimating Bear Steams' top
five executives' net non-salary gains at $650 million and Lehman's top five executives' net non-salary
gains at over $400 million).
35. Id. at 70 (citing evidence from a 2008 Congressional committee hearing that Fuld earned
$490 million); James Sterngold, How Much Did Lehman CEO Dick Fuld Really Make? BLOOMBERG Bus.
WEEK, Apr. 29, 2010 (reporting evidence from former Lehman attorney and whistleblower Oliver Budde
that Fuld understated his earnings by failing to disclose stock sales that pushed his income above this
level).
36. See infra text accompanying notes (discussing legal ruling protecting Lehman from paying
damages to defrauded homeowners despite findings that Lehman knew of and assisted this fraud).
37. SHARYN L. ROACH ANLEU, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE (2010).
38. Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, I AM.
Soc. REV. 894 (1936).
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especially sociology-to push policy analysis beyond "law on the books" to a deeper
understanding of the complications of "law in action."
But by the end of the century, the term "unintended consequences" more
strongly signaled declining faith in the twentieth century regulatory state and its
welfare state policies. An entry for the phrase in the free-market oriented Liberty
Fund's Concise Encyclopedia of Economics explains that the term "most often ...
illuminates the perverse unanticipated effects of legislation and regulation."40 As this
entry indicates, the phrase "unintended consequences" not only reminds us to
consider a policy's positive or negative "side effects," but also further warns that a
policy's primary impact may be to perversely impede or undo its intended purpose.
Cass Sunstein's 1990 article Paradoxes of the Regulatory State is an example of how
legal scholarship from a variety of political perspectives has thrived on detailing this
kind of regulatory "pathology" and on suesting more "flexible" and "market-
oriented" solutions to these policy problems.
As a shorthand to this problem of self-defeating law reforms, the phrase
"unintended consequences" typically challenges policies aimed at promoting the
public interest by controlling potentially harmful self-interested behavior. The term
targets centrist, liberal, or progressive policies that purport to improve or cushion the
harsh economic effects of private "market" behavior. The phrase suggests that
policies intended to protect those at the bottom are particularly likely to fail and even
to make things worse, further tilting the scales of justice against those not already at
the top. If egalitarian policies have perversely harmful effects, then policies of
upward redistribution can appear to be the best strategy even for those committed to
egalitarian goals.
The term operates by pushing us to look beyond moral ideals to
42incentives. It draws on the logical assumption that proscriptions or penalties on
certain self-interested behavior will induce people to adjust their behavior to achieve
their self-interest in another way (assuming at least some individual freedom).43
Regulating private self-interest to achieve the public interest does not simply and
neatly redirect harmful private action towards public benefits, but instead may
encourage different strategies of harmful private gain, which may well be even more
destructive to the asserted public interest. Summing up this problem, Sunstein (who
became Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs under
President Obama), explained that:
[T]he world simply cannot be held constant after regulations have
been issued. Strategic responses, the creation of perverse
incentives for administrators and regulated entities, unanticipated
changes in product mix and private choice-these are the
hallmarks of the paradoxes of the regulatory state.44
39. See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1995).
40. Rob Norton, Unintended Consequences, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, (2d ed.
2008), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html.
41. Cass Sunstein, Paradoxes ofthe Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407 (1990).
42. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, 7 (5th ed. 2009).
43. See Sunstein, supra note 41, at 413.
44. Id.
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Classic examples of the "unintended consequences" story target regulation
aimed at manipulating prices or otherwise regulating goods and services in order to
protect those most vulnerable to harm in the existing "market." 45 Rent control aims
to make housing more affordable, but can lead private landlords to skimp on repairs
or convert rentals to condominiums, thereby reducing the supply of good affordable
housing. Minimum wage laws aim to raise income for workers, but can end up
reducing a worker's access to higher income if higher labor costs lead employers to
replace workers with machines, to move to jurisdictions with no minimum wage
laws, or to reduce investments that will lead to more job creation. Laws imposing
safety requirements on consumer products may reduce safety if users see this
increased protection as an opportunity to adopt riskier behavior, such as driving
faster in cars with seat belts. Environmental regulations aimed at limiting one type
of pollution or conserving one resource may backfire by encouraging the substitution
of one polluting practice for another more polluting practice of an endangered
resource. Government spending to support people in poverty leads to more people in
poverty because subsidies increase incentives for people to engage in whatever
activity is subsidized. 47
But why should the term "unintended consequences" do so much to
undermine policies aimed at supporting those disadvantaged within the existing
political economy? The truism that good intentions can go awry can apply to any
policy with a benign rationale. Questions of the substantive effects of policies are by
nature contestable, complex, and dependent on perspective, context, and ideological
presumptions. For example, whether the presence or absence of strong wage
regulations helps or harms workers over the long run has received extensive
theoretical and empirical analysis.
The "unintended consequences" theme gets its real power to defend
inequality from its links to a bigger ideological story contrasting the imperfect results
of public interested policy with the theoretically perfect aggregate welfare produced
by a free market driven by the "invisible hand" of individual self-interest. The
popular ideology of Ayn Rand takes the free-market story to an extreme by
eschewing good intent: it righteously embraces self-serving gain as the objective
48
source of truth and justice. More generally, the term suggests an inevitable divide
between moral aspirations and actual achievements, so that the very virtuousness of
equality suggests policy failure in contrast to what then appears as the more modest
but realistic social benefits of policies that accommodate rather than challenge
"market" inequalities.
Indeed, the concept of "unintended consequences" helps repackage and
revive the naturalized view of inequality embedded in much of the Lochner-era
jurisprudence. The infamous 1905 Lochner decision4 9 limited bottom-up regulations
45. See CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH, Unintended Consequences and Intended Non-Consequences,
10-13 (June 2009), available at http://www.aei.org/speech/100056 (summarizing standard free-market
economic arguments about perverse unintended consequences from liberal regulation).
46. See MANKIW, supra note 42, at 7.
47. See DeMuth, supra note 45, at 7-9; see also Martha T. McCluskey, The Politics of
Economics in Welfare Reform, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HoMo ECONOMICUS (Martha A. Fineman &
Terence Dougherty eds., 2005) (criticizing this argument).
48. AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS: A NEW CONCEPT OF EGOISM (1964)
49. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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with a similar assumption that existing economic and political inequalities represent
fundamental forces of nature outside the scope of public policy. By ruling that
wage and hour laws violated an individual's constitutional right to freedom of
contract, the Supreme Court obscured the extensive background laws that impeded
workers' power to contractually bargain for results beneficial to their interests.
Most mainstream legal scholars reject the Lochner-era precept that an
unequal political economy structured to deny workers' and consumers' power is
fundamental to constitutional freedom, and instead adopt the post-New Deal theory
that economic equality and security is a legitimate goal for legislative and executive
action. But many still draw on Lochner's essentialized notion of market freedom to
make policy arguments against progressive regulation.
For example, in his 1993 article Political Equality and Unintended
Consequences, Cass Sunstein argues that the Supreme Court turned back toward
Lochner by treating unequal campaign spending as a fundamental freedom.52 But
Sunstein relied on the "unintended consequences" theme to justify backing off from
robust regulation of unequal power over elections. He explains that campaign
spending regulations have in some ways enhanced elite influence, perverting the
purported goal of furthering political equality. Sunstein notes that some forms of
spending restrictions may particularly hurt challengers in their efforts to overcome
the enormous advantages held by incumbents in the current system,53 by encouraging
other forms of problematic special interest spending or even secret gifts.54 Reflecting
on these possible results, he concludes with half-hearted support for "softer"
alternatives such as limiting incentives for public financing, lamenting that any
reform enacted by Congress deserves distrust due to the likelihood of self-dealing.55
Sunstein's analysis shows how, on the surface, the concept of unintended
consequences seems consistent with critical legal scholarship's understanding of the
politics of law. Like critical legal scholarship, the idea of unintended consequences
challenges liberalism's faith in law's ability to constrain power with normative
principles. Law remains the master's tool, as LatCrit theory reminds us, so that law
reforms appearing to dismantle the master's house will in fact end up fortifying it.
But the concept of unintended consequences subtly helps divert and confuse
that critical analysis of the relationship between law and power. Influential centrist
and liberal legal scholars (like Sunstein) have often invoked the concept of
unintended consequences to justify a more cautious and accommodating approach to
regulation in a variety of legal subject areas. Indeed, this widespread retreat from
intellectual support for aggressive regulatory controls helped encourage and
legitimate the financial deregulation that created the conditions for the recent crisis.
50. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 40, 67 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein,
Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
51. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
52. Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUN. L. REV.
1390 (1993).
53. Id. at 1400, 1401.
54. Id. at 1407-10.
55. Id. at l411-14.
56. Leslie Espinoza, A Vision Towards Liberation, 19 CHICANO-LATINo L. REV. 193 (1998)
(citing Audre Lorde, The Masters Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in THIS BRIDGE




By rationalizing the surrender to unequal and destructive powers as a more
sophisticated and legitimate approach to justice, rather than as a failure of justice, the
prevailing "unintended consequences" story can increase the power to turn law's
good intentions into bad results.
Unlike a critical understanding of the politics of law, the "unintended
consequences" theme points back to Lochner by reifying and even legitimating the
top-heavy power that undermines bottom-up policies. Even when it stops short of
Lochner's constitutionalization of that power, the story of "unintended
consequences" deflects attempts to explore and change the legal ground on which
that power depends. The master's tools include not just law but the ideology that law
is powerless to disrupt a naturalized order of inequality outside of law.
III. RETELLING THE STORY OF LAW'S BAD RESULTS
How, then, can we take apart the concept of "unintended consequences" as
part of a step toward an ideological retooling of law to better resist the upward
transfer of resources, in the current crisis and beyond? A number of critical questions
can help uncover how the term hides the role of law and human design in producing
and maintaining the power relations that appear to constrain law's capacity for broad,
beneficial results. Using the financial crisis as an example, these questions unravel
the surface concern of avoiding harmful effects to show the underlying support for
that harm.
First, we should ask how the "unintended consequences" framework steers
analysis away from the interests and values of those who gain from harmful policies,
so that the harm appears to arise from an inevitably challenging and uncertain
technical puzzle or a tragic accident of nature, rather than from the wrongful or
careless exercise of power. Second, we should ask how the theme of "unintended
consequences" implicitly rehabilitates what would otherwise be illegitimate action.
Third, we should examine how the "unintended consequences" story tends to
legitimize harm by presumptively directing blame to the victims. By obscuring the
agency of those who gain from harmful results, the story of "unintended
consequences" directs attention to the power and responsibility of those who bear the
harm. Fourth, we should ask how explaining harm as "unintended consequences"
averts rigorous analysis of alternative policies that might produce less harm and
more egalitarian results. The "unintended consequences" message tends to attribute
bad effects to the general powerlessness of law in the face of uncertainty and
complexity, rather than to the foreseeable power of particular policy choices to lead
to harm.
A. What Contested Ideologies and Interests Hide Beneath "Unintended
Consequences"?
First, critical analysis should ask how descriptions of "unintended
consequences" tend to obscure conflicts about moral and political intent. By calling
harmful results "unintended," the phrase suggests a happy consensus about the
public interest that runs into unfortunate technical glitches when implemented.
Consider how the phrase was used by former Senate Banking Committee
Chair and now bank executive Phil Gramm, leading sponsor of laws easing
restrictions on the financial industry. As the financial markets unraveled in 2008,
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many pointed fingers at Gramm, labeling him "the father of the financial crisis."57
Gramm defended his legacy of financial industry deregulation by explaining that the
economic crisis largely resulted from the "unintended consequences" of the
prevailing monetary policy-the Federal Reserve's low interest rates-that worked
well to regulate normal business inventory cycles, but failed in the face of the
distinctive speculative housing bubble of the early 2000s.5
This term invokes a plausible picture of a complex economy rife with
uncertainty that can easily trip up well-meaning experts as they sift through evidence
of the market's ups-and-downs to decipher the economic future. Gramm goes on to
also blame the crisis on policies supporting equality in lending and housing,
following the standard storyline targeting progressive policy as particularly
perverse. Nonetheless, by first using the term against the presumably bipartisan,
technocratic, and market-oriented monetary policy, Gramm's analysis appears to be
a relatively nonpolitical observation about the inherent risks in even the most modest
and accommodating attempts by government to steer the market in the public
interest.
But Gramm's use of the term masks how the inevitably imperfect technical
calculations that comprise monetary policy are embedded in a broader normative
vision of political and economic well-being. During his much-celebrated reign,
Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan designed his policies to foster upward
redistribution, systematically controlling interest rates to favor capital over labor,
creditors over debtors, and financial speculation over the real economy, as journalist
William Greider has explained. Greenspan's policies supported financial asset
bubbles that created fabulous and highly concentrated wealth despite high risks to
the middle class and to the stability of the system as a whole. The policy of cheap
money in the early 2000s, for example, did not support general business investment,
gains in median household income, or other measures of broad economic growth, but
instead mainly inflated housing prices and the returns on high-risk mortgage-backed
62
securities. Though Greenspan personally may not have been motivated by
conscious animosity or an overt desire to harm most Americans, his words and
actions reflect intent to privilege financial market gains over other measures of well-
being, and to ignore the substantial evidence of the speculative, unequal,
exploitative, unstable, and even fraudulent nature of much of those gains.63 When
policies based on this fundamentalist faith in financial market gains did indeed lead
57. Paul Krugman, The Gramm Connection, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2008),
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/29/the-gramm-connection/.
58. Phil Gramm, Deregulation and the Financial Panic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at
Al7,available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123509667125829243.html. See also DeMuth, supra
note 45, at 4 (explaining Gramm's comment as a criticism of Greenspan's policy response to the high-tech
stock bubble).
59. Gramm, supra note 58.
60. William Greider, The One-Eyed Chairman, THE NATION (Sept. 1, 2005),
http://www.thenation.com/article/one-eyed-chairman.
61. WILLIAM A. FLECKENSTEIN, GREENSPAN'S BUBBLES: THE AGE OF IGNORANCE AT THE
FEDERAL RESERVE 5 (2008).
62. JOHNSON & KWIAK, supra note 7, at 147.
63. See, e.g., FLECKENSTEIN, supra note 61, at 31-35, 62, 66-70 (describing how Greenspan
ignored evidence of financial market bubbles, instead taking on faith that market gains reflected
mysterious real productivity that followed new economic rules); HUDSON, supra note 6, at 247; DEAN
BAKER, FALSE PROFITS: RECOVERING FROM THE BUBBLE ECONOMY 1-7 (2010).
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to enormous short-term returns to many in the financial industry, with devastating
longer-term harm to ordinary investors, businesses, consumers, and workers
generally, the label "unintended" understates the impact of this upward-oriented
ideology.
Choices about what consequences and what economic measures to value in
setting monetary policy are not self-evident or value-neutral. A very different
ideology guided the Federal Reserve's policy in the mid-twentieth century, as
Timothy Canova has analyzed. During that time, the Fed's policies followed a
more egalitarian vision, promoting full employment along with stable and strong
growth, by combining low-interest rates with strong financial market controls.65 This
alternative approach to monetary policy was institutionalized through legal rules,
66making the Fed more transparent and accountable to ordinary Americans. Gramm's
comment reveals how the term "unintended consequences" ignores this history by
attributing the financial crisis problems to an unpredictably changing economy,
rather than to a changing ideology that valued gains to Wall Street over investments
67in "Main Street" business.
In questioning the contested values underlying descriptions of "unintended
consequences," critical analysis requires that we ask where those values get their
power. By deflecting attention from political agency, the label "unintended
consequences" obscures the self-interested purposes of those with the most power to
influence historical and cultural change.
In particular, former Senator Gramm was "not just present, but an active
participant" in the ideological shift that redirected economic policy to embrace a top-
down vision, as Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson note in explaining the crisis's roots in
a political movement that purposefully pushed for upward redistribution.68 Hacker
and Pierson identify Gramm along with Greenspan as perhaps the two most powerful
69
advocates of that movement. In over two decades in Congress, Gramm devoted his
legal reform efforts to enshrining Wall Street's position as what he called a "holy
place, rejecting regulations against predatory lending by insisting that the subprime
industry was the 'American dream in action."' Working closely with Greenspan,
Gramm masterminded the 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act (also known
as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) repealing New Deal protections against systemic
risk,71 and the enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,
which allowed the growth of derivatives and other risky financial practices during
the subsequent bubble.72
As part of this movement, Gramm was a prominent supporter not just of
64. Timothy A. Canova, The Federal Reserve We Need, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Oct. 11,
2010), available at http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article-the-federal reserve we need.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. JOHNSON AND KWAK, supra note, at 31, 147 (explaining how low interest rates in the
1930s combined with lack of controls on speculative and highly leveraged financial risk-taking fueled the
Great Depression and how the low interest rate policies of the 2000s channeled capital into speculation
rather than meaningful economic growth).
68. HACKER AND PIERSON, supra note 20, at 196 (2010).
69. Id. at 197.
70. Id. at 197-198.
71. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (repealing part of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act).
72. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 20, at 197.
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financial deregulation but also of Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan's monetary
policy, defending him against critics as an "oracle" and as "the greatest banker of the
century." 3 In an adulating review by the Senate Banking Committee of Greenspan's
qualifications for another term in 2000, Gramm put Greenspan at the "top of the list"
",74of those deserving credit for producing an economic "golden age.
The ideological leadership epitomized by Gramm and Greenspan reflects
more than an abstract concern with economic principles and public well-being. The
rising political interest in financial market deregulation directly correlated with rising
financial industry political contributions, making that sector the largest source of
political funds during the 1990s and 2000s.75 One analysis calculated that the
financial industry spent $1.7 billion on campaign contributions from 1998 to 2008,
and $3.4 billion on lobbying. Gramm received more campaign contributions from
commercial banks than anyone else in Congress from 1989 to 2002, and he was
among the top five recipients of funding from Wall Street interests in general.77 As
Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, Gramm raised twice the amount of money
from the securities industry than from any other sector. When Gramm left Congress
in 2003, he became a vice chair and lobbyist for the largest Swiss bank, USB, which
reaped substantial profits during the financial market bubble of the early 2000s not
only by structuring subprime securities, but also by facilitating widespread tax
evasion for wealthy Americans; this company also went on to receive a massive
bailout from the Swiss government when the bubble collapsed in 2008.79 Gramm's
wife received a lucrative position on Enron's corporate board a few weeks after she
used her position as Chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to alter
federal regulations to ease federal control over Enron's energy futures contracts and
others, smoothing the way for the deception that led to that company's collapse.80
The fact that the financial industry spent so lavishly to advance its political
and financial policies suggests that financial executives and politicians, rather than
trusting in a ready consensus, understood that their political vision would have to
overcome competing interests and contrary facts. Gramm stands out as particularly
disingenuous in his use of the phrase "unintended consequences" to describe the
policies that not only enriched him personally but that generated extensive evidence
of harm that he actively and persistently denied. Faced with looming evidence of
disaster in the summer of 2008, Gramm (then a top advisor to Republican John
McCain's presidential campaign) publicly dismissed this evidence as unjustified
whining, insisting that the economy had never been better.8 1
73. FREDERICK J SHEEHAN, PANDERER TO POWER: THE UNTOLD STORY OF How ALAN
GREENSPAN ERICHED WALL ST AND LEFT A LEGACY OF RECESSION 245, n. 31 (2010).
74. Id. at 243.
75. JOHNSON & KWIAK, supra note 7, at 90-91.
76. Id. at 91 (citing Essential Information & Consumer Education Foundation, Sold Out: How
Wall St. and Washington Betrayed America (Mar. 2009), http://www.wallstreetwatch.org.)
77. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 20, at 198.
78. JOHNSON & KWIAK, supra note 7, at 91.
79. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 20, at 198.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 196.
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B. What Intentional Wrongdoing Does "Unintended Consequences"
Excuse?
The phrase "unintended consequences" not only puts an innocent face on
policies of harmful results, but also helps excuse intentional disregard of the harmful
intent behind these policies. Christopher DeMuth, longtime president of the
conservative American Enterprise Institute, explains that the term puts a polite
veneer over American policy debates by evading questions of motivation and by
maintaining the fiction that harmful actions are unfortunate mistakes among
"gentlemen" dedicated to the public good.82 Describing policy failures as
"unintended consequences" can serve to legitimate policies grounded not only in
bias, self-dealing, or callous disregard, but also actual law breaking, particularly by
the relatively powerful.
The term sweeps a wide range of wrongdoing under the general cover of
self-interested behavior. For example, Sunstein attributes "futile or self-defeating"
regulations to the problem that "mandates and bans invite efforts at circumvention,"
inducing "adaptation" by those regulated or by the regulators. This description begs
the crucial question of the substance of this strategic behavior: for instance, whether
a ban on unsafe products leads a business to devote its resources to safety
innovations rather than (for instance) to aggressive legal defense tactics, or to
systemic deception about its products' safety, or to lobbying for regulatory
loopholes, or even to helping managers and investors use insider trading and foreign
banks to stash their gains before problems emerge. Sunstein's description makes
unethical and illegal behavior seem to be the normal and necessary result of vague
but scientific "incentive effects," with terms like "adaptation" suggesting a
naturalistic process of evolution outside of individual control. Furthermore, this view
suggests that resistance to law is reflexively determined by the strength of the
regulatory command, creating a catch-22 in which policies aiming for the most
control on wrongdoing seem inevitably to risk the greatest harm.
The "unintended consequences" story tends to not only accept elite
wrongdoing as routine or inevitable but to reconstruct that wrongdoing as beneficial.
Sunstein describes as "creative" those who strategically respond to regulatory
controls with new harmful behavior.8 This puts a positive spin on resistance to law
by linking it to normal or even ideal market self-interest maximizing. Echoing
Lochner's reasoning legitimating employers' potentially coercive and exploitative
legal power as inherent market "freedom," such descriptions tend to diffuse debate
about wrongdoing with a presumption of admirable innovation and entrepreneurial
risk-taking.
By facilitating this slippage between illegality and superior market
productivity, the "unintended consequences" story helps fuel the harmful
consequences it purports to analyze. The recent crisis, and its upwardly redistributive
impact, are the consequences of an explicit shift throughout many levels of
government and business toward policies aimed at overlooking, accepting, or even
embracing fraud, theft, and other illegal or generally destructive forms of economic
82. DeMuth, supra note 45, at 3-4.
83. Sunstein, supra note 52, at 1411.
84. Id.
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gain.
By 2004, the FBI warned of a fraud "epidemic" perpetrated by mortgage
lenders.85 In his investigation of the subprime mortgage industry, journalist Michael
Hudson compiled numerous examples of how executives of leading mortgage
companies implemented business plans that relied on the deception and coercion of
homeowners. For example, subprime companies designed staff hiring policies, staff
trainings, and employee rewards to promote sales practices centered on misleading
homeowners about the costs and amount of their loans. Managers strategically
cultivated low moral standards and conformism among staff by encouraging and
supporting a workplace culture of alcohol and drug use, bullying, and race and
gender discrimination.88
One loan officer summed up his work as theft: using lies and evasion to sell
subprime loans primarily to consumers who qualified for much cheaper prime
rates. A loan officer for Ameriquest (the largest subprime lender) explained that
"every closing" amounted to a "bait and switch" operation because the loans were so
overpriced and irrational that dishonest sales were the only way to get customers.90
Ameriquest and other subprime companies relied on practices such as forging and
altering loan documents, manipulating or falsifying appraisals, and denying
borrowers access to required disclosures of fees and loan amounts.9 ' Employees and
managers who attempted to stop such practices were routinely ignored, overruled,
penalized, or fired. These illegal tactics, and the cover-up strategies needed to
sustain them, sometimes allegedly even included bribery, sex, and violence. 93 Sales
staff and managers who joined in this culture of fraud were rewarded with lavish
commissions and perks (such as luxury cars and vacations at elite resorts) designed
to hook sales staff into upper-class aspirations only sustainable through further
illegal and unethical actions.
This systemic wrongdoing particularly operated to take assets from those
85. William K. Black, The Two Documents Everyone Should Read to Better Understand the
Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-k-black/the-two-
documents-everyonb _169813.html.
86. See, e.g., HUDSON, supra note 6, at 237, 266-67, 273 (discussing evidence uncovered by
state investigations of Ameriquest, testimony to state investigators by CEO of holding companies related
to Ameriquest, and evidence of fraud in 70% of the mortgages issued by Aurora Loan Services, and that a
manager installed by Lehman stormed out of an investigative meeting yelling, "Your people find too
much fraud").
87. HUDSON, supra note 6 at, 153-157.
88. HUDSON, supra note 6, at 80, 160, 219-220 (discussing charges of race discrimination
against First Alliance Mortgage Company, culture of "racism, sexism, and callousness" at Ameriquest,
along with widespread cocaine use among managers and company events featuring strippers and illegal
drugs, and use of sexual harassment to punish employees complaining about fraud at the subprime lender
BNC, financed by Lehman).
89. Id. at 113 (quoting Greg Walling, a loan salesman for First Alliance Mortgage Company
(FAMCO)).
90. Id at 3.
91. Id. at 1-3, 64, 156-57, 162-64, 218-19, 223, 232-34.
92. See id. at 65, 113, 234-35, 237.
93. Id at 84, 204-06 (discussing litigation claims that First Alliance Mortgage Company hired
thugs to severely injure a consumer attorney and bribed his clients after he filed a class action for fraud
against the lender, and subprime lending saleswomen trading sex to brokers for steering borrowers to their
high cost loans, and use of sexual harassment against employees who reported fraud).
94. Id. at 97-98.
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near the bottom or those teetering on the edge of the middle class, making the harm
of the illegal behavior especially devastating. The subprime industry targeted its
fraudulent practices to indebted homeowners whose economic struggles were
exacerbated by a combination of factors such as: illness, personal trauma, job loss,
divorce, advanced age, mental and physical disability, language barriers, race, and
gender. Subprime lenders understood that these customers would have the least
power and resources to bargain for a fair deal, or to seek other alternatives once they
suspected that they had been deceived.9 5 Further, subprime lenders capitalized on the
harmful results of their own fraud, marketing additional refinancing to customers at
risk of default on the mortgages such borrowers had recently bought, thereby
extracting additional fees while pushing homeowners into a downward spiral of
unpayable debt.96
This upwardly "redistributive" wrongdoing was not just a problem of rogue
practices by the shady subprime industry, but instead was at the core of the
mainstream financial industry's booming profits. Leading financial firms, along with
rating agencies, investors, and regulators, embraced securitized subprime mortgages,
and the related risk-spreading instruments that made those securities appear viable,
97
as an innovative plan for high returns (and high fees) with minimal risk. The
growth of the subprime business would have been impossible without a pipeline of
outside funding from large investment banks, since the mortgages largely were
designed as a Ponzi scheme to generate profits from short-term fees and interest from
unsound loans that could only be paid off through the sale of even more unsound
mortgages or from ever-increasing home values. Without securitization and related
financial "innovations" that could chum these unsound mortgages into the
appearance of viable investments, the subprime business would soon have collapsed
from borrower defaults and lawsuits.9 9
Wall Street firms not only took advantage of shady subprime lending, but
actively led the subprime business into further unsound practices. New York Times
business reporter Joe Nocera points to correspondence from a Wall Street financial
firm urging a subprime mortgage seller to reduce its credit score cutoff, explaining
that its funders wanted its business tactics to be "as bad as" its competitors. 00 One
101
state lawmaker summed up the system as a grand money laundering operation.
Former banking regulator and legal expert on financial fraud William K. Black
explains that Lehman knew fraudulent loans were its principal source of (fictional)
95. Id. at 87-89.
96. See id. at 244 (reporting one in nine loans made by Ameriquest in 2004 was to refinance
its own loans less than two years old).
97. JOHNSON & KwIAK, supra note 7, at 123-24.
98. See, e.g., HUDSON, supra note 6, at 196.
99. See Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Great Mortgage
Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1310-11 (2009); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a
Blind Eye: Wall St. Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007) (explaining how
securitization harms borrowers by creating financial industry incentives to promote high cost and unsound
lending).
100. Joe Nocera on "All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis,"
DEMOCRACY Now (Nov. 23, 2010),
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/11/23/joe-nocera-on all the devils (interviewing Nocera, a reporter
at the New York Times and author of book on the crisis).
101. HUDSON, supra note 6, at 174 (quoting Georgia state senator Vincent Fort).
36 [Vol. 22:1
"UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES"
income, and that it dealt with the associated risks by strategically increasing the
volume of this fraudulent lending and then engaging in extensive accounting fraud to
(temporarily) drive up its stated profits (and executive compensation) to record
heights.102 A Citibank senior vice president testified that in 2006 he realized that
about 60% of the supposedly prime mortgages that Citibank was selling to Freddie
Mac, Fannie Mae, and other investors did not comply with stated underwriting
standards, but that despite many warninR, Citibank's management increased those
"defective" loans to 80% of its business. Goldman Sachs agreed to a $550 million
settlement for a civil fraud case charging it had sold subprime mortgage investments
designed to fail. By the end of 2010, the only prominent executive who was
personally penalized for fraud was the CEO of Countrywide, who settled a civil
fraud case by the Securities and Exchange Commission for $67.5 million. No
criminal charges have been brought against any mortgage lender or financial industry
executive for the systemic fraud behind the crisis. 1'6
In a 2003 ruling, a federal trial court found "significant, active and knowing
participation" by Lehman Brothers in the fraudulent practices of one of its major
subprime lenders. 0 7 This lender had followed the typical subprime business pattern
of filing for bankruptcy after its executives had skimmed off the company's assets. 0 8
When the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's finding that Lehman had actual knowledge of lender fraud and substantially
assisted these fraudulent practices, the judges rejected Lehman's attempted
distinction between supporting the subprime business and supporting its particular
acts of fraud, concluding the distinction is meaningless if that "whole business is
built like a house of cards on a fraudulent enterprise." 0 9 Nonetheless, the court
interpreted punitive damage and bankruptcy laws to protect Lehman from substantial
legal responsibility for compensating defrauded borrowers. 0
By portraying this disregard for legality as a universal "adaptation" to
incentives by naturally self-interested individuals, the "unintended consequences"
story of law's failure evades analysis of the specific legal rules that create and
sustain incentives for illegality-and the contingent choices individuals, legal
experts, and business organizations make in response to those incentives. When
102. Black, Statement on Lehman Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 5-12; see also Black, supra
note 85 (discussing how financial firms knowingly targeted fraudulent loans to provide near-certain
executive enrichment from (fictional) gains).
103. Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government Sponsored
Enterprises, Hearing before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (April 7, 2010) (statement of Richard
M. Bowen, Il).
104. Zachary A. Goldfarb, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record Settlement in Fraud Suit, Change
Business Practices, WASH POST (July 16, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR2010071505111 .html.
105. Morgenson, supra note 33.
106. Jesse Eisinger, The Feds Stage a Sideshow, While the Big Tent Sits Empty, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.conV2010/12/08/where-are-the-financial-crisis-prosecutions/
(arguing that the civil settlement represents further lax treatment of elite financial fraud).
107. Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc., 471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006).
108. HUDSON, supra note 6, at 139 (noting that froml998 to 2000, most of the largest
subprime lenders went bankrupt, though many soon regrouped under different names to repeat the
practice).
109. Henry, 471 F.3d at 995.
110. HUDSON, supra note 6, at 197-98, 299; Henry, 471 F.3d at 989, 999.
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former Senator Phil Gramm used the term to politely shift blame for the crisis to
Greenspan's low interest rates, he not only obscured the contested intent of that
monetary policy but also how that policy (like those at the ground level of the
subprime market) was explicitly designed to reconstruct, permit and even subsidize
questionable financial market activity as productive "innovation."' Greenspan (like
Gramm) repeatedly dismissed evidence that the subprime market was rife with fraud,
insisting that deception was too fuzzy a concept to be the basis of law and actively
112
leading efforts to dismantle and block regulatory efforts.
Even when bemoaning the fraud in hindsight, experts commenting on the
crisis nonetheless continue to invoke the idea of "unintended consequences" to shift
responsibility for this fraud away from those who used it as a strategy for gain and to
justify maintaining the policies that enabled it. Judge Richard Posner focused blame
for the crisis on regulators who were "asleep at the switch,"'" but he excused
financial industry wrongdoing as rational self-interest maximizing that was induced
by lax regulations.114 Following the circular logic of the "unintended consequences"
story, Posner then argued against substantially tightening regulatory systems to
address this failure, on the theory that such changes are unlikely to be successful
given the history of powerful industry efforts to capture regulators and to weaken
enforcement." 5
Attributing the systemic fraud driving the crisis to a historical "regulatory
failure" naturalizes and legitimates this system of upwardly redistributive
wrongdoing by essentializing it as an inherent and universal feature of politics and
law. To the contrary, law professor and former bank regulator William Black
explains that federal agencies' pervasive refusal to enforce laws against the endemic
fraud underlying the crisis was not normal politics inherent human fallibility, or the
result of inevitable incentives for economic gain. Instead, this regulatory weakness
was an intentional policy change, overtly rationalized by a particular ideology
consciously promoted not just by some regulators and self-serving industry interests
but also by a din of academics and public intellectuals like Posner who endlessly
warned of the harmful "unintended consequences" of regulatory controls compared
to "market incentives."
Specific policy changes weakening regulation of financial fraud included
federal law reforms easing restrictions on highly leveraged activity, federal
preemption of state predatory lending controls, reduced federal resources for
financial fraud enforcement, and an overall enforcement strategy favoring favored
voluntary agreements or "flexible" settlement decrees that deferred to industry
judgment. In particular, the Federal Reserve repeatedly rejected expert advice and
111. See JOHNSON & KWIAK, supra note 7, at 104-109 (discussing the ideology of finance
promoted by Greenspan and others).
112. HUDSON, supra note 6, at 247; see also JOHNSON & KwiAK, supra note 7, at 142-43.
113. RICHARD A. POSNER, A CRISIS IN CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 167 (2010).
114. Richard Posner, The Financial Regulation Law-Posner's Comment, The Becker-Posner
Blog (July 11, 2010, 4:10 pm), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2010/07/index.html.
115. POSNER, supra note 113, at 262.
116. See Black, supra note 85 (discussing how the Federal Reserve in particular has led an
ideological and policy movement to weaken regulation designed to minimize fraud).
117. See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWIAK, supra note 7, at 137-42 (discussing changes in financial
regulatory policy); HUDSON, supra note 6, at 93 (describing Justice Department Attorney Deval Patrick's
comments about the "flexible" settlement of race discrimination charges against a leading mortgage
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empirical evidence of rampant wrongdoing in the subprime market, particularly
affecting minority and low-income communities, and expressly refused to use its
power to protect consumers rather than elite financiers." 8 As Senate Banking
Committee Chair, Gramm refused to hold hearings on predatory lending legislation,
and similarly blocked regulations that would have restricted conflicts of interests in
accounting firms involved in securities deals. 19
These policy changes were supported by an ideology of market
fundamentalism based on faith that uncontrolled self-interest of powerful business
owners and managers would naturally benefit society.1 In part, this ideology
promotes the idea that the deregulated market's "invisible hand" will better control
fraud, race discrimination, and other economic behavior harmful to overall
welfare.' 2' This view tends to dismiss the extensive evidence to the contrary by
insisting that deceptively opaque and highly unequal gain amounts to innovative
production that will push beneficial economic growth to new heights. Greenspan, for
example, joined the subprime mortgage industry's leaders in celebrating the growth
of that market as an innovative way to expand beneficial credit to underserved
122
groups. He similarly praised the growth of mortgage securitization and the related
interdependent derivatives market as an "extraordinarily useful vehicle" for
transferring risk to those who can productively gain from it, despite evidence that
this risk-spreading would likely increase widespread instability and deceive
investors. Against the strong criticism of this ideology from some political leaders,
regulators, consumer advocates, and scholars, Greenspan explained that even if this
financial "innovation" was suspect, stopping any bad behavior would be impossible
without interfering with beneficial economic growth.124 Legal scholars also were an
important part of the chorus urging regulatory restraint as a means of fueling
beneficial innovation.125
The crisis has even appeared to give new power to the ideology that elite
financial gains must take precedence over consumer well-being. After the risks had
materialized into a global crisis in 2009, Ben Bemanke, who succeeded Greenspan
as Federal Reserve Chair, cautioned against burdening lenders with new regulations
on the theory that encouraging financial "innovation" will increase access to
26
affordable credit. In late 2010, as Republican Senator Spencer Bachus prepared to
company in 1996).
118. JOHNSON & KwIAK, supra note 7, at 142.
119. HACKER AND PIERSON, supra note 20, at 197.
120. HUDSON, supra note 6, at 43 (quoting Greenspan).
121. Id. at 43, 167 (discussing how Greenspan promoted the theory that businesses' interest in
an honest reputation will defeat temptations for quick profits at the expense of consumers and the
prominence of this view in the administration of George W. Bush); JOHNSON & KWIAK, supra note 7, at
103 (discussing how Greenspan' s ideology of market perfection led to his insistence that financial fraud
was unnecessary and the growth of derivatives was proof of their social benefits).
122. JOHNsON & KwIAK, supra note 7, at 112, 143.
123. Id. at 102-103, 106 (discussing how Greenspan's ideology influenced numerous policies
shaped by the Federal Reserve and Greenspan's views on mortgage securitization); Peter S. Goodman,
Taking Hard New Look at Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2008), at Al (quoting Greenspan's
praise for the unregulated growth in derivatives).
124. Goodman, supra note 122.
125. See, e.g., Ziwicki, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1,
2-3 (2009).
126. JOHNSON & KWIAK, supra note 7, at 107 (citing Ben S. Bemanke, Financial Innovation
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become the new chair of the Senate Banking Committee, he notoriously commented
that regulators should serve banks, not regulate them.127 Though he later backtracked
by saying that he meant he would not "micromanage" the banks,128 his history as
chief Republican negotiator for the 2008 financial industry bailouts (and his career
supported by over $1 million in bank campaign contributions)" 9 suggests a "macro"
approach consistent with a vision of service over regulation. Revealing how
"deregulation" rhetoric slides into rationalizations for an ideology of unequal law,
Congressman Ron Paul affirmed Bachus's comments by urging that bank regulators
be replaced with a market where "law and order" requires people to fulfill their
contracts. 30
In the prevailing ideology, strict regulatory supervision and strong penalties
for wrongdoing are a sign of outdated, naive, and rigid bureaucracy. Instead, the
dominant view presents a more forgiving and "flexible" approach to regulation as
not only more practical and realistic but also as bold, exciting, and sophisticated. In
this context, elite financial activity that crosses the line into illegality can be
portrayed as "cool" and even "sexy" creativity. In contrast, when those at the
bottom skirt the law for economic gain, their behavior is increasingly criminalized as
irredeemably destructive. Note, for example, the strict moralism used to condemn
undocumented immigrants in the popular slogan "What Part of Illegal Don't You
Understand," despite substantial evidence that unauthorized migration can produce
broadly distributive and lasting economic gains. In contrast, "undocumented" loans
in the subprime boom were widely characterized as financial market "innovation"
rather than illegality.132 A similar double standard has been advanced by legal
scholars and commentators who oppose efforts to modify homeowners' mortgage
debt to avoid foreclosure and resulting socioeconomic harm, arguing that changing
these contractual obligations will undermine respect for the rule of law. 33
Recent evidence shows that rampant creditor illegality continues in the
foreclosure process that was left in the wake of the real estate bust. Unregulated
and Consumer Protection (Apr. 17, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke20090417a.htm.
127. Mary Orndorff, Sen. Bachus Finally Gets his Chairmanship, THE BIRMINGHAM NEWS
(Dec. 9, 2010), http://blog.al.com/sweethome/2010/12/spencer-bachus-finallygetshi.htmi.
128. Jay Fitzgerald, Frank Lays Into Successor, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 16, 2010, § Bus., at
29 (reporting that Democratic Rep. Barney Frank dismissed this "clarification," citing Bachus's policies
opposing regulation protecting consumers).
129. See Press Release, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, Big Bank Bachus
Thinks Government Exists to 'Serve The Banks' (Dec. 13, 2010), available at
http://dccc.org/newsroom/entry/big bank bachus-thinks government existsto-serve-the-banks/.
130. Real Time Economics, Ron Paul: I Don't Think We Need Regulators, WALL ST. J.
BLOGS (Dec. 17, 2010, 3:07 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/12/17/ron-paul-i-dont-think-we-
need-regulators/.
131. JoHNSON & KWIAK, supra note 7, at 113 (noting that this ideology was reinforced by
popular representations of Wall Street greed as "cool, seductive, and even sexy").
132. See Kevin Johnson, What Part of "Illegal" Don't You Understand? One Response: What
About Rational Dialogue and Reasonable Debate Don't YOU Understand?, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG
(Oct. 28, 2007), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2007/10/what-part-of-il.htm (noting and
criticizing the use of this phrase to advocate for the criminalization of economic migration).
133. See, e.g., Alvin C. Herrell, The Great Credit Contraction: Who, What, When, Where, and
Why, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1209, 1255-1257 (2010); Judge H. Lee Sarokin, Does the Defense of
Foreclosures by Lawyers Border on the Unethical?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 22, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judge-h-lee-sarokin/does-the-defense-of-forec b 787027.html.
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mortgage servicing subcontractors typically can reap short-term gains by using fraud,
robo-signing, and other illegal practices that increase foreclosures and avoid
beneficial loan modifications, thereby leading to long-term losses for both borrowers
1 34and lenders and for the broader economy. Although state governments have taken
steps to prosecute this fraud and to suspend the foreclosure process, federal
government leaders of both major parties have refused or have ignored numerous
proposals to stem these continuing illegal financial practices. For example, Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner has prohibited states from using the 2008 federal bailout
package's anti-foreclosure funds to provide legal assistance to borrowers facing
foreclosure.136 The Senate blocked similar funding, authorized by the Dodd-Frank
financial reform bill, as part of a general spending cap, even though the legal aid was
likely to produce a net savings in government funds as well as savings for investors
and borrowers.137
The Treasury Department explained its decision by noting that legal
assistance is not strictly "necessary or essential" for borrowers to secure loan
modifications.m Echoing the larger story of "unintended consequences," this
rationalization excuses illegal and harmful actions by elites on the ground that law
has little power to affect the results. By denying funds for legal assistance to
homeowners victimized by foreclosure fraud, while further subsidizing banks for
their dubious loan modification efforts, Secretary Geithner chose a legal course
likely to fail in the face of "market" incentives for short-term gains from foreclosure
fraud.
C. How Does the "Unintended Consequences" Story Invert the Power to
Harm?
A third line of critical inquiry should examine how the "unintended
consequences" story subtly inverts the picture of harmful or even illegal intent,
making law's failure seem to be a problem of excessive and abusive power by those
at the bottom. By suggesting that the interests of those most harmed already have
received extensive attention and protection in law, it can then appear that further
134. Gretchen Morgenstern, Opening the Bag of Mortgage Tricks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010,
at BUI (discussing $5.1 million punitive damages award to investors for illegal actions mortgage servicers
resulting in improper foreclosures); Laurie Roberts, Banks Favor Foreclosing Over Altering Home Loans,
ARIz. REPUBLIC, Dec. 4, 2010, at Bl; Robert Selna, Banks' Notices Seen as Faulty, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 31,
2010, at Al; Teresa Dixon Murray & Michelle Jarboe, The Next Crisis, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH)
Oct. 17, 2010, at Al (warning of harmful results from rampant scandals in foreclosures, giving as
examples one homeowner evicted and bankrupted after a fourteen cent error in his mortgage payment led
to exorbitant late payment fees and another whose home was foreclosed by the same bank that refused the
homeowner's mortgage payments on the ground that the bank did not hold the mortgage).
135. Joe Nocera, The States Take On Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010, at B.
136. Zach Carter, Geithner Blocking Legal Help for Foreclosure Victims, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/14/geithner-blocking-legal-h n_796773.html.
1 37. Zach Carter & Ryan Grim, Senate Sacrifices Struggling Homeowners to Budget Gods,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/21/senate-sacrifices-
trouble n 799861.html.
138. Id. (citing memo by Treasury Department General Counsel George Madison); see also,
David Streitfeld, Homes at Risk, and No Help from Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, at A3
(discussing lack of legal services in California for foreclosure cases due to state law denying payment to




attention and protection is likely to cause further harm. As a result, the story of
"unintended consequences" invites policy reforms aimed at undermining egalitarian
policies, even as it hides the motivating anti-egalitarian ideologies and interests by
describing the logical effects as "unintended."
For example, former Senator Gramm is one of many advocates of policies
protecting high-risk financial gains by the wealthy who have used the term
"unintended consequences" to blame the crisis and its harm on those with intentions
for equality (rather than on purposeful policies of inequality).'39 A milder version of
this theory holds that general enthusiasm for expanding credit and homeownership
inadvertently encouraged complex and opaque financial instruments that hid
systemic instability and fraud until it was too late to fix. More aggressive versions of
this story assert that liberal support for racial and economic equality forced the
financial industry to sacrifice economic soundness in a self-defeating attempt to
protect poor and minority people from their own irresponsibility. This story typically
fingers fair lending laws and government sponsored lending entities like Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae.
By making liberal intentions and public institutions the subject of the story,
the "unintended consequences" argument uses rhetorical position to confer a
presumption of power on egalitarian policies. At the same time, this narrative
positions those who gain from unequal results as passive objects of others' actions.
In this picture of the crisis, the financial industry executives who earned outlandish
compensation for their superhuman financial acumen and momentous
responsibilities-and the prestigious scholars who cheered their success-were not
capable of independently evaluating or acting on the evidence of risk in the subprime
market and in the new financial arrangements that supported it. Further, this dazzling
complexity appears to arise from external forces mysteriously set in motion by
liberal law, rather than from the agency of conservative financial leaders, regulators,
and academics, who actively supported financial complexity as creative productivity;
and who purposefully dismissed the evidence that these financial schemes potentially
foster illegality, illusion, and instability.
The "unintended consequences" story ignores how uncertainty and lack of
knowledge is not just a limit on power but an effect and privilege of power. Consider
the response of Roland Arnall, head of the largest subprime lending business and
major contributor to the 2004 Bush Presidential campaign, to questions in a 2005
Senate hearing that led to his appointment as Ambassador to the Netherlands. Arnall
emphasized that his important position insulated him from knowledge or
responsibility for the concerns that had sparked legal actions against his companies
by dozens of states, explaining that "unfortunate stuff happens" at a lot of big
companies.140 In one of many examples revealed in investigations of how his
business banked on obscuring this "misfortune," when fraud investigators at his
company alerted senior management that (for example) their staff was selling
mortgages on nonexistent properties, the managers' response was to explain that
securitization would off-load and hide the losses certain to result. 141
Centering the story on the misguided power of egalitarian intentions begs
139. Gramm, supra note 58.
140. HUDSON, supra note 6, at 260.
141. Id. at 268.
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the question of the intent as well as the influence of those who enabled the growth of
risky mortgage lending and financial market complexity. Legal scholar Kurt Eggert
gives detailed evidence showing that executives of leading subprime lenders were
not blinded from risk by egalitarian impulses or overwhelmed by complexity, but
instead rationally embraced a business strategy of boom, bust, and bankruptcy.142
These executives and many of those who assisted them calculated that the unsound
loans would ruin their companies along with borrowers and downstream investors,
but strategically insulated short-term profits so that they could walk away from the
collapsing system with near-certain massive gains.143
Classic stories of "unintended consequences" tend to not just evade non-
egalitarian intent, but also to attribute that intent to proponents of liberal policies. By
identifying elite interests with natural market forces, while positioning liberal
intentions as the source of human power, the term tends to link narrow or "special"
interests to proponents of liberal law rather than to elitist opposition to those laws.
Like critical legal analysis, this story pokes holes in liberal ideals by recognizing that
laws against discriminatory or predatory lending-or restrictions on speculative or
nontransparent financial transactions-may spur even worse lending systems. But
discussions of unintended consequences ultimately deflect critical analysis by
attributing this harm to the essential flaws of liberal law, rather than (for example) to
the contingent power of the financial industry to use campaign donations to block
more effective regulations.
Many opponents of liberal regulation, for example, have blamed Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-backed mortgage financing entities, for
contributing to the crisis through unsound practices encouraged by egalitarian intent
and political influence. While the relatively marginal participation of those more
legally constrained and supposedly public-serving entities gave some further
legitimacy to the unsound investments sweeping the market, the interests and
ideologies driving gain from exploitative lending would not disappear if liberal
intentions and if egalitarian rhetoric were further pushed to the margins. Moreover,
the power to exploit liberal intent would not appear as strong without the backing of
inegalitarian law, such as the constitutional protections for corporate campaign
spending.
By insisting that the mysteries and uncertainties of modern finance
overwhelm the rational human planning of well-meaning government and industry
leaders, the gentler "unintended consequences" story of liberal culpability directs
fear and anger toward those on the bottom. If well-meaning expert leaders and
mainstream institutions fail to maintain rational control, then this suggests that the
most pathological people are in danger of taking over. The usual suspects of
socioeconomic deviance, such as foreigners, immigrants, poor people, and racialized
"inner city" communities, can then be rounded up to bear responsibility as economic
insecurity fans popular fears. The myth that the mildly egalitarian policies of the
1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)144 forced gullible or powerless bank
executives to back loans that they otherwise would have rejected as unprofitable
142. Eggert, supra note 99, at 1262-63.
143. See HUDSON, supra note 6, at 252 (discussing Ameriquest owner Roland Arnall's
strategic protection of his gains).
144. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2010).
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persists in the face of overwhelmingly contrary facts,145 such as evidence that the
vast majority of the loans driving the crisis were made by lenders outside the scope
of the CRA- that, indeed, the CRA generally restrained unsound lending where it
did apply; 14 that the mortgage sellers and their financial backers rationally embraced
unaffordable loans for short-term economic gain rather than out of irrational politics
or idealism; and that, even worse, the CRA (along with antidiscrimination laws) had
been insufficiently strong to prevent lenders from aggressively using race
discrimination to exclude minority borrowers from affordable and regulated prime
market loans and to steer them into predatory and fraudulent subprime loans.148
Similarly, the logic that disproportionately blames low-income and minority
homeowners for their irresponsible borrowing and complicity in mortgage fraud gets
its power from attributing to those homeowners a level of rationality, knowledge,
and independent agency denied to the financial industry actors (and their expert
supporters) who gained the most from those unsound loans. 149
Further, by attributing the appeal of egalitarian policies to outsized and
uninformed intentions, the "unintended consequences" story not only helps redirect
blame toward traditionally victimized groups but also helps deny the power of their
often superior knowledge and practical effectiveness. Ironically, as New York Times
reporter Joe Nocera concludes from his book blaming both government and industry
leaders for failing to pay attention to the harmful consequences of a high-risk
financial system, those at the bottom and their closest allies stand out as the rare
exceptions in the system who used their power and knowledge to take strong action
to stop the unsound economic behavior that caused the crisis.'50 Many community
activists, anti-poverty advocates, minority groups-and the state prosecutors and
lawmakers who listened to this constituency-produced and acted on accurate
ground-level knowledge of the dangers of the system, but were constrained by the
institutionalized power of industry lobbyists and political donors and also by the
government leaders, judges, and scholars who have helped expand federal
preemption, constrain consumer litigation, and otherwise interpret laws to limit the
power of state governments and of private citizens to give teeth to egalitarian laws.
145. See Mary Kane, Scapegoating Minorities for Failures of Banking, FAIRNESS AND
ACCURACY IN REPORTING (Jan. 2009), http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=3669 (discussing how the
media spread this myth and the contrary evidence that discrimination against minorities fueled the crisis).
146. BAKER, supra note 63, at 30.
147. National Community Reinvestment Coalition, Safe and Sound Lending In
Neighborhoods: An Examination of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) at Work in Washington,
D.C. and Houston, TX (Aug. 2010),
http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/mediaCenter reports/ford nhood%20analysis-execsum.pdf (giving
evidence that CRA lending increased prime loans, not subprime lending, in minority and modest income
neighborhoods).
148. See Ira Goldstein & Dan Urevick-Ackelsberg, Subprime Lending, Mortgage
Foreclosures, and Race, Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity 4 (2008)
http://4909e99d35cada63e7f757471b7243be73e53el4.gripelements.com/pdfs/goldsteintrf paper.pdf
(discussing studies suggesting race discrimination rather than financial risk decreased supply of prime
mortgage lending to African Americans and Latinos); id. at 7 (discussing evidence of decreased
enforcement of race discrimination in lending by federal government between 2001 and 2008).
149. See HUDSON, supra note 6, 251 (explaining a state investigator's analysis of why lenders
rather than borrowers were the primary source of fraud).
150. Goodman, supra note 122.
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D. How Does "Unintended Consequences " Analysis Dismiss More
Effective Alternatives?
Fourth, we should ask how the debate about more effective legal and
political action gets cut off by labeling bad results as "unintended consequences." In
his writings on the crisis, Judge Posner argues against aggressive law reforms by
stressing that the vast uncertainty and complexity of modem financial markets and
the limited knowledge of regulators make such reform more risky than inaction. 151
Numerous financial law reforms have been challenged on the ground that even
modest restrictions on financial elites will backfire to produce further harm, as
lenders, rating agencies, investors, and associated financial industry interests resist or
circumvent those laws: for example, by constricting needed credit, by seeking profits
from even less transparent instruments and in more shadowy and unregulated
financial sectors, or perhaps by effectively using their economic influence in
elections or regulatory agencies to undo these modest changes. 52 One widely
publicized quip from a Republican Congressman summed up the 2010 Dodd-Frank
financial reform legislation as having "three unintended consequences" on each of its
over 2,000 pages.
It may well be true that Wall Street still has plenty of power to bring down
Main Street if Wall Street doesn't continue to get its way. Maintaining lax
regulations and indulgences such as lavish executive compensation and government
subsidies may seem necessary because Wall Street controls the credit on which Main
Street, not to mention inner city and rural America, depends. But Wall Street's
power to resist regulation and to transfer the losses of its risk-taking is not a problem
of the inscrutable "invisible hand" of economics, of the inevitably limited knowledge
of regulators, or of the inherent powerlessness of law. By taking a step further to
challenge the contingent legal structures and ideas about law that support this power,
we can show how regulatory reforms could more effectively be structured to avoid
harming so much of Main Street America and so many communities of color.
Unlike critical legal scholarship that carefully analyzes strategies for
redirecting and resisting law's harmful politics, the idea of "unintended
consequences" tends to divert attention from the problem of power even as it seems
to recognize it. By stopping short of detailed examination of the structural context
shaping extra-legal power, stories of "unintended consequences" tend to lead away
from the creative and rigorous analysis of the foundational rules and assumptions
shaping the politics of law. For example, even though Sunstein's analysis of the
failures of campaign finance regulation recognizes the challenges of breaking
through incumbent political power, he takes incumbents' anti-democratic interests as
an enduring fact of political life without carefully digging into the legal
underpinnings of that power. Ignoring existing or historic evidence that less
oligarchic political systems can be possible, he narrows his inquiry and imagination
151. POSNER, supra note 112, at Ch. 5, 11.
152. See, e.g., Tom Petruno, A Fix, But for Better and For Worse?, L.A. TIMES, June 26,
2010, at lB (quoting Ed Yingling, president of the American Bankers' Association prediction of
decreased credit from banking restrictions).
153. Daniel Henninger, A Plague of Vagueness, WALL ST. J., July, 1, 2010, at A17
(suggesting the remark from Jeb Hensarling (R., Texas) should be in the Bartlett's famous quotations
book).
452012]
BERKELEY LA RAZA LAW JOURNAL
to exclude reforms that go beyond simply regulating campaign spending to consider
the framework that makes that incumbent spending so difficult to resist (winner-take-
all rather than proportional voting, for instance). As a result, Sunstein concludes with
half-hearted suggestions for accommodating rather than resisting money's corrupting
power.154 Draining the issue of political equality of its moral force and popular
appeal, his focus on the "unintended consequences" of campaign finance regulation
portrays the policy options as highly uncertain and complex calculations of largely
offsetting costs and benefits, making inaction and acquiescence as attractive as
change.
Turning to the recent crisis, if we understand the harmful effects of the
Federal Reserve's monetary policy as a problem of clearly articulated and highly
effective bias toward elite financial interests at the expense of others, a logical legal
solution-with the possibility of uniting right and left radical political energy-could
be not just to institute more consumer protection rules within or without the Federal
Reserve, but to shift power over the Federal Reserve from financial industry experts
to democratic oversight and involvement. Further, if the government solved the
problem of "too big to fail" financial firms by breaking up these firms rather than by
propping them up, it could not only improve financial market stability but also set in
motion a "virtuous" circle of competitive pressures that would decrease the banks'
current power to influence political campaigns, executive culture, and legal
ideology.
For another example, progressive economist Dean Baker proposes changing
the background rules of mortgage lending to decrease banks' power over borrowers,
explaining that this would more effective than the Obama Administration's failin
"incentive-based" effort to prevent foreclosures by subsidizing loan modifications.
Even if those subsidies were more strictly regulated, their effectiveness would likely
be reduced by the costs of adequate enforcement and further "creative" gaming by
banks. 57 Instead, if law reforms gave homeowners facing foreclosure the right to rent
their foreclosed homes for several years at market rates, foreclosure would be less
profitable for banks while homeowners and communities would avoid harmful
displacement, vacancies, and property devaluation.158
The problem with the upwardly redistributive politics driving the recent
crisis is not uncertainty about what legal reforms would be effective in breaking the
power of oligarchy in Congress, but the lack of organization and leadership to build
power to fight for those reforms.159 The right-wing political movement for upward
redistribution has demonstrated that organization and leadership is not a matter of
"politics" beyond the scope of law but instead can be shaped by stories about law as
well as by changing legal technicalities. 1o One step in changing these politics would
be to replace simplistic and fatalistic legal stories of "unintended consequences" with
careful and creative legal work showing how alternative laws could make things
different.
154. Sunstein, supra note 52, at 1411-14.
155. JOHNSON & KWIAK, supra note 7, at 219.
156. BAKER, supra note 63, at 94-95.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 96-97.
159. HACKER AND PIERSON, supra note 20, at 303; JOHNSON & KWIAK, supra note 7, at 221.
160. STEVEN TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT (2008).
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IV. RECLAIMING THE POWER OF EGALITARIAN-POLICY
By essentializing current inequalities as the best of all possible worlds, the
concept of "unintended consequences" has come to deliver a message of
disentitlement to power in the guise of a superficial critique of law's politics. As a
counterpoint, consider Derrick Bell's critical race analysis of the politics of law. Bell
has argued that racial justice efforts should appeal to white self-interests rather than
to legal and moral equality principles. 161 Yet Bell's "interest convergence" theory
does not take white interests in racial privilege as a fixed fact to be accommodated or
incentivized, or to be left to experts for cautious calculation of the costs of racial
backlash. He instead focuses on the possibilities for grassroots movements to
emphasize the beneficial spillover effects from policies promoting racial equality, as
part of an effort to divide and to reformulate white interests and identities, and to
build new political coalitions against economic elites.162 Applied to the financial
crisis, for example, the backlash against fair lending and community reinvestment
requirements shows not that these policies are inevitably self-defeating but that more
political, ideological, and legal work must be done to show how broad
socioeconomic gains could come from a financial system that better protects those in
the middle and at the bottom.
The theme that harmful consequences matter more than good intentions in
economic policy strikingly contradicts another prevailing view of law. To a large
extent, courts have applied contemporary equality doctrine to allow superficially
163
neutral intentions to excuse racially harmful consequences. In response to
extensive statistical evidence of unequal racial results in mortgage lending, for
example, the banking industry has mobilized a campaign to narrow civil rights laws
to allow only claims of discriminatory intent, not discriminatory impact. Many
scholars, judges, and advocates have rationalized a broader trend to limit what counts
as unlawful race discrimination on the theory that unequal racial results are naturally
and normally driven by benign intent-such as reducing costs, measuring merit, or
enhancing flexibility and discretion in mortgage pricing or in death penalty
165
sentencing6-and that these presumed and potential good purposes count more than
actual evidence of harmful racial results or covert harmful racial intent.
How can we explain this contradictory logic that insists on evaluating
161. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518 (1980).
1 62. Derrick Bell, On Celebrating an Election as Racial Progress, AM. BAR ASSOC. HUMAN
RIGHTS MAGAZINE, Fall 2009, p. 2, 3-4, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/humanrights magazine home/irr hrfall09_home/irr-hr-fallO
9 bell.html.
163. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical View of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1977-78); Charles R.
Lawrence, Ill, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 317 (1987); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997).
164. Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Banking Industry's Attack on
Disparate Impact Race Discrimination Claims Under the Fair Housing Act and The Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 18 PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2008).
165. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection clause to Georgia's death penalty despite statistical evidence of racial
disparities in sentencing).
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economic regulation by its consequences while evaluating discrimination by overt
intent? Both precepts reflect an underlying problematic principle that what is truly
harmful in law is caring about harm to those at the bottom, especially the racialized
bottom. That principle assumes unequal harm results from an unassailable natural (or
supernatural) order that (rightly or wrongly) transcends law. Laws with overtly
egalitarian substantive intent to protect those at the bottom will be redirected by this
higher power to malign or to wasteful ends, hurting those at the bottom. At the same
time, in this flawed logic, laws with more neutral intent must not be scrutinized or
challenged for malign or misguided harmful effects on those at the bottom, out of
fear that disturbing the existing hierarchical order will risk a backlash of even greater
inequality. Either way, law appears out of place and unreasonable when it attempts to
intervene in the existing conditions of inequality.
Consider a recent case brought by the city of Baltimore against Wells Fargo
claiming that overt, intentional racially discriminatory lending in violation of fair
housing laws led to concentrated foreclosures that in turn reduced property values
and increased the city's costs for social services, police and fire protection.166 The
court dismissed the case for lack of standing, acknowledging that the plaintiffs may
have had sufficient evidence that the lenders exploited borrowers because of their
social and economic "dysfunctional environment," but concluding that unscrupulous
lenders cannot reasonably be assumed to have caused the "dysfunctional
167
environment" that they exploited. The court refused to allow the city to bring
expert evidence that Wells Fargo's predatory lending contributed to the harmful
conditions from which it illegally profited, although it did allow the city to bring
claims of more limited harm. The court's reasoning seemed to naturalize and
legitimate both the harmful racial consequences and the harmful racial intent of
subprime lending. By suggesting that the "dysfunctional environment" in African-
American communities was the cause of the racially biased lending, and therefore
not plausibly also an effect of that exploitation, the court's ruling subtly suggests that
intentional race discrimination-and its harmful effects-can be a normal and
natural response to the normal and natural powerlessness of communities of color.
By similarly making structures of inequality appear beyond the reach of law
reform, the "unintended consequences" message helps update and reinforce the
narrowing of protections against intentional racial harm. Justice is centrally a
question of whose interests and whose harms should count, in what context and in
what form and to whom. Power is centrally about being able to act without having to
take harm to others into account. This power to gain by harming others is strongest
when it operates through systems and structures that make disregarding that harm
166. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Md.
2010); Raymond H. Brescia, On Private Plaintiffs and Public Harms: The Standing of Municipalities in
Climate Change, Firearms, and Financial Crisis Litigation, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
7, 27-28 (2010) (discussing the ruling dismissing the case on standing grounds); see also Raymond H.
Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, The Fair Housing Act and Emerging Issues in
Litigation Regarding the Subprime Crisis, 2 ALB. Gov'T. L. REv. 164, 175-78 (2009) (discussing the
allegations of race discriminatory lending in the Baltimore case).
167. Wells Fargo, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d at 851 (stating that although "unscrupulous lenders"
may have illegally taken advantage of "inner city residents living in a dysfunctional environment," it does
not follow that it is reasonable to infer "that the unscrupulous lenders themselves caused the dysfunctional




appear routine, rational, and beneficial or at least acceptable or perhaps inevitable.
By portraying law's unequal harms as the "side effects" of systems and structures
with unquestionable "main effects," the "unintended consequences" story helps
affirm the resulting harm even as it seems to offer sympathy and technical assistance.
In considering solutions to the financial market problems, the policy puzzle
is not that struggling homeowners' interests are overwhelmingly complex or
uncertain. Instead, the bigger problem is that overwhelmingly powerful interests and
ideologies are actively resisting systemic changes that would make those interests
count. The failure to criminally prosecute or otherwise severely penalize high-level
financial industry fraud is not primarily the result of uncertainty about the harmful
effects of that fraudulent behavior, but because the political and justice systems are
skewed to protect the gains and unaccountability of wealthy executives despite the
clear harms to hosts of others. The unequal effects of the prevailing policy response
to the crisis are foreseeable and obvious, not accidental or surprising. It would not
take advanced knowledge of economics to readily predict that modest-income
homeowners would tend to be far worse off than bank executives by a policy
approach that failed to provide substantial mortgage forgiveness and foreclosure
protections for modest-income homeowners but instead provided massive subsidized
credit and other protections for Wall Street. Many policy actions likely to alleviate
the unequal harm of the crisis similarly are impeded not because consumer
advocates, low-income homeowners, or racial justice advocates hesitate to risk major
changes in existing systems, or are divided about the technical design of alternative
programs or more effective mechanisms for enforcing laws against fraud and racial
discrimination. Instead, the problem is that these voices pressing for effective change
are often excluded, drowned out or distorted in Congress and in federal agencies
such as the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve, or in the media, in the
mainstream economics profession, and to a large extent in legal scholarship about
financial markets. More generally, those diverse voices from the bottom have been
largely absent or marginalized in the dominant theoretical framework that constructs
widespread and severe inequality as unforeseeable and largely inevitable, or even
beneficial.
Moreover, justice requires careful attention to both harmful intent and to
complex harmful effects. But the concept of "unintended consequences" inverts
justice by suggesting that the best way to care for those at the bottom is to not care to
make law more attentive to the bottom. "Unintended consequences" arguments
promote a simplistic moral message in the guise of sophisticated intellectual
critique-the message that those who lack power should not seek it because the
desire for more power is what hurts most. Further, like Ayn Rand's overt philosophy
of selfishness, that message promotes the theme that those who have power to ignore
their harmful effects on others need not-indeed should not-be induced by law to
care about this harm, because this caring is what is harmful. One right-wing think
tank has recently made this moral message more explicit with an economic values
campaign suggesting that the intentional pursuit of economic equality is a problem of
the immoral envy of those whose economic success proves they are more
deserving.169 Legal scholars and advocates who intend to put intellectual rigor and
169. See Grieving the Good of Others: Envy and Economics Project on Values and
Capitalism (Sept. 20, 2010 Conference), AM. ENTER. INST., http://www.aei.org/event/100292.
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justice ahead of service to financial elites should reject stories of "unintended
consequences" and instead scrutinize the power and laws that have so effectively
achieved the intention of making devastating losses to so many of us seem natural,
inevitable, and beneficial.
